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Introduction 
In the last ten years, a healthy debate about the moral nature and 
limits of apology has emerged, focused particularly on the growing 
practice of official apologies by states, governments, corporations 
and churches. There now exists a substantial body of work dedicated 
to distinguishing the conditions for a morally and politically adequate 
public apology, and how these relate to broader issues of historical 
and collective responsibility, as well as numerous articles theorizing 
the language, pragmatics, politics, discourse, economics, 
performance, cultural variation and emotions involved in publicly 
apologizing.1  
                                                 
1 See, for example, Michael Cunningham, “Saying Sorry: The Politics of Apology,” 
The Political Quarterly 70.3 (1999): 285–293, doi:10.1111/1467-923X.00231; John 
Borneman, “Public Apologies as Performative Redress,” SAIS Review 25.2 (2005): 
53–66, doi:10.1353/sais.2005.0028; Sandra Harris, Karen Grainger, and Louise 
Mullany, “The Pragmatics of Public Apologies,” Discourse and Society 17.6 (2006): 
715–737; Alison Dundes Renteln, “Apologies: A Cross-Cultural Analysis,” in The 
Age of Apology: Facing up to the Past, ed. Mark Gibney et al. (Pennsylvania: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 61–76; Matt James, “Wrestling with the Past: 
Apologies, Quasi-Apologies, and Non-Apologies in Canada,” in The Age of Apology: 
Facing Up to the Past, ed. Mark Gibney et al. (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 2008), 137–153; M. Augoustinos, B. Hastie, and M. Wright, 
“Apologizing for Historical Injustice: Emotion, Truth and Identity in Political 
Discourse,” Discourse and Society 22.5 (2011): 507–531. 
1
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It is disappointing, therefore, that theoretical work on the 
topic has largely failed to take seriously questions of gender.2 The 
severity of this omission is especially striking once we acknowledge 
the growing body of evidence concerning “the ways gender plays a 
role in generating, or at least shaping, the forms and the effects of 
political violence perpetrated under authoritarian regimes and during 
armed conflict.”3 Gender is deeply implicated in some of the most 
serious harms for which public apology is invoked as remedy. 
Similarly, feminist work in philosophy, psychotherapy, and on 
restorative justice has highlighted the significant role that gender 
plays in practices of apologizing; indeed, this research suggests that 
acts of apology (both private and public, political and apolitical) are 
already gendered, often in problematic ways.4 It would seem that 
gender rears its head when we consider the figure of the apologizer, 
                                                 
2 Aaron Lazare and Nick Smith both include short sections on gender and apology, 
but in both cases their discussion is largely limited to the comparative apology 
styles of men and women and, in particular, claims based on sociologist Deborah 
Tannen’s work, that women apologize more than men. My intention in this paper is 
to convince the reader that the relationship between gender and the practice of 
apologizing goes far deeper than the quality and quantity of men’s and women’s 
individual utterances. See Aaron Lazare, On Apology (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004), 27-31; see also Nick Smith, I Was Wrong: The Meanings of Apologies 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 108-113. 
3 Ruth Rubio-Marin, “The Gender of Reparations in Transitional Societies,” in The 
Gender of Reparations: Unsettling Sexual Hierarchies While Redressing Human Rights 
Violations, ed. Ruth Rubio-Marin (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 
63. 
4 See J. Haaken, “The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Psychoanalytic and Cultural 
Perspectives on Forgiveness,” in Before Forgiving: Cautionary Views of Forgiveness in 
Psychotherapy, eds. Sharon Lamb and Jeffrie Murphy (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002); Sharon Lamb, “Women, Abuse and Forgiveness: A Special Case,” in 
Before Forgiving: Cautionary Views of Forgiveness in Psychotherapy, eds. Sharon Lamb and 
Jeffrie Murphy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Sharon Lamb, 
“Forgiveness Therapy in Gendered Contexts: What Happens to the Truth?” in 
Trauma, Truth and Reconciliation, ed. Nancy Potter (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2006), 229-256; Elizabeth Spelman, Repair: The Impulse to Restore in a Fragile 
World (Boston: Beacon Press, 2002); and Julie Stubbs, “Beyond Apology? Domestic 
Violence and Critical Questions for Restorative Justice,” Criminology and Criminal 
Justice 7.2 (2007): 169-187.    
2
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that of the recipient, the content of the apology, or the practice 
apologizing itself. 
Why should a philosopher of apology pay attention to gender, 
in particular? Philosophers have focused on the moral nature of 
public apologies; that is, how such apologies function to take and 
express responsibility appropriately, to acknowledge the impact of 
wrongful harm on victims, and to contribute to moral and relational 
repair following wrongdoing.  Philosophers have asked themselves 
when and for what it is morally appropriate to apologize, as well as 
how best to accomplish this task – that is, what makes for a good or 
even an ideal apology.5  Normative theories of apology refer to 
familiar moral-philosophical themes of responsibility, respect, and 
moral emotion.  In assessing an apology, we ask how serious the 
wrong was, how deeply it harmed and disrespected the victim, how 
far the apologizer takes responsibility, and how sincere her remorse 
appears to be. Yet feminist philosophical work has challenged 
traditional approaches to responsibility and to the emotions, 
demonstrating how both our moral practices and subsequent 
philosophical reflection on them are implicitly gendered, often in 
ways that harm or undermine the agency of women.6  If the complex 
                                                 
5 For an overview of the philosophical literature on apology, see the following 
sources: Louis F. Kort, “What Is an Apology?” Philosophy Research Archives 1 (1975): 
80-87; Kathleen Gill, “The Moral Functions of an Apology,” The Philosophical Forum 
31.1 (March 2000): 11-27, doi:10.1111/0031-806X.00025; Spelman, Repair: The 
Impulse to Restore in a Fragile World; Sharon Lamb and Jeffrie Murphy, Before Forgiving: 
Cautionary Views of Forgiveness in Psychotherapy (Oxford, New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2002); Margaret Urban Walker, Moral Repair: Reconstructing Moral Relations after 
Wrongdoing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Charles Griswold, 
Forgiveness: A Philosophical Exploration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007); Nick Smith, I Was Wrong: The Meanings of Apologies (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008); Linda Radzik, Making Amends: Atonement in Morality, Law, 
and Politics (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); and Christopher 
Bennett, The Apology Ritual: A Philosophical Theory of Punishment (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010).   
6 The traditional ‘responsible person’, for example, was represented as an atomistic, 
autonomous, unencumbered individual, defined apart from their significant 
relationships.  Feminists have shown both how this picture of the autonomous self 
only represents—at best—a select, elite few (whose autonomy depends on the 
3
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collection of behaviours, images, trait-attributions, and power 
relations that together constitute gender affects how we conceive of 
and recognize moral wrongs, respect, responsibility, and remorse, 
then the nature of apologizing cannot be separated from the genders 
of those engaged in it.  
In this paper, I present a two-part argument for ‘gendering’ 
theories of public apology. First, I show that gender is deeply 
implicated in significant harms for which public apologies are 
demanded.  Second, I argue there are multiple connections between 
gender and practices of public apology, connections that become 
evident once we consider apologies as public narratives, performed in 
public spaces and expressive of public responsibility. 
 
Apologies and Gendered Harm 
Apologies are offered in the aftermath of wrongful harm. In making 
an apology, the apologizer represents him or herself as someone who 
takes responsibility for the actions in question, views them as both 
wrongful and harmful, acknowledges their impact on his or her 
victim(s), and expresses regret and remorse for both the wrongs and 
their effects on others.7  Many apologies go further in taking 
                                                                                                             
labour of others) and how it fails to acknowledge a myriad of other ways in which 
we are responsible and responsive to one another, in chosen and unchosen 
relationships. 
7 The language of ‘taking’ responsibility is a deliberate choice here.  Some may 
argue only the wrongdoer herself can apologize: anyone else would not bear the 
appropriate relationship of moral responsibility. I disagree; accomplices, inactive 
bystanders, witnesses, and members of a morally relevant collective may find 
themselves called upon to take responsibility for some or all of a given wrongdoing, 
or may wish to present themselves as responsible by apologizing for it.  Insisting 
that no one but the primary wrongdoer can appropriately apologize ignores the 
complexities of responsibility for wrongdoing, as demonstrated by recent feminist 
work on the topic.  See Iris Marion Young, “Responsibility and Global Labor 
Justice,” Journal of Political Philosophy 12.4 (2004): 365-388; Tracy Isaacs, Moral 
Responsibility in Collective Contexts (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); and 
Serena Parekh, “Getting to the Root of Gender Inequality: Structural Injustice and 
Political Responsibility,” Hypatia 26.4 (2011): 672-689. Whether that relationship of 
responsibility is accepted by the putative recipient (and others) is a different 
4
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responsibility: offering some compensation or reparation, promising 
not to engage in any further, similar, actions or policies, and taking 
further steps to mend or build the relationship between apologizer 
and addressee. 
Central to the success of a given apology is the question of fit: 
do the elements of narrative (i.e. the story that is told by the 
apologizer), responsibility, and future commitment fit the seriousness 
and extent of the wrongful harms in question? Do they match up to 
what happened? To whom it happened? Do they accurately describe 
the relationships involved? An apology can misfire when its 
recounting of the wrong does not match the victim’s own 
understanding, whether by downplaying the harm involved, offering 
excuses, casting the apologizer’s intentions in a better light, or 
glossing over key aspects of the injury. Equally problematic are 
apologizers who address the wrong victim altogether, 
mischaracterizing what happened by rewriting to whom it happened. 
Apologies are performative utterances—in J.L. Austin’s terms, they 
do things with words8—and what they do is accomplished, in large 
part, by the story that is told: their narrative power. Apologies can 
alert others to the very fact of wrongdoing, draw witnesses’ attention 
to the extent of the harms done, elicit sympathy and solidarity from 
new sources, and can convince skeptics that the victim’s claims are 
legitimate. Part of the demand for an apology arises out of the 
satisfaction that comes from having one’s story acknowledged 
publicly, especially if the events have caused distress, or have been 
widely denied: “Yes, that’s what happened to me. That’s why it hurts. 
That’s it, exactly.” The narrative power of public apologies is 
especially significant, as these can also alter legal and political record, 
changing official histories, and can reverberate across media and 
popular discourses both nationally and internationally. 
 Thus normative theorists of public apology ought to pay 
attention to gender if for no other reason than the content of public 
                                                                                                             
question, but by apologizing, one of the things an apologizer does is to position 
herself in a relationship of responsibility to the act in question.  
8 J. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1975). 
5
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apologies—how we conceive of and articulate what gets apologized 
for—affects their practice, and gendered harms are something for 
which public officials are called upon to apologize. Indeed, there are 
four different kinds of harm in which gender is particularly 
implicated. They include gendered harms to groups targeted on the 
basis of gender, e.g. sexual violence as a tool of war, harms to mixed-
gender groups that have a gendered dimension that intensifies or 
amplifies the harm (e.g. certain harms to families and family homes), 
patterns of sexism and gender-based exclusion, and harms likely to be 
overlooked for gender-related reasons. 
 In a period nicknamed the “Age of Apology,”9 the culture of 
ubiquitous apology has not yet extended to gendered harms; 
apologies for harms against groups of women remain relatively rare. 
Official apologies are typically invoked as a form of symbolic 
reparation, offered alongside financial and material reparations, in the 
aftermath of conflict or oppression,10 and efforts to include 
reparations for harms against women in any larger reparation 
movements are still nascent— indeed, recognition of many gendered 
harms themselves is recent. Acts of sexual violence can now be 
charged as war crimes, acts of genocide, and crimes against humanity 
under international law, but this recognition only solidified with the 
International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda 11. Moreover, sexual violence is not the only harm women 
suffer in situations of armed conflict and political oppression. 
Margaret Urban Walker’s work on gendered violence and reparations 
makes the case for recognizing a far more complex matrix of 
                                                 
9 Mark Gibney, Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann, Jean-Marc Coicaud, and Niklaus 
Steiner, The Age of Apology: Facing up to the Past (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2008). 
10 Margaret Urban Walker, “The Expressive Burden of Reparations: Putting 
Meaning into Money, Words, and Things,” in Justice, Responsibility and Reconciliation in 
the Wake of Conflict, eds. Alice MacLachlan and C. Allen Speight, Boston Studies in 
Philosophy, Religion and Public Life (Dor: Springer, 2013). 
11 Margaret Urban Walker, “Gender Violence in Focus: A Background for Gender 
Justice in Reparations,” in The Gender of Reparations: Unsettling Sexual Hierarchies While 
Redressing Human Rights Violations, ed. Ruth Rubio-Marin (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), 18. 
6
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gendered violence, emphasizing how gender may augment or 
reinforce broader harms in complicated and subtle ways, while Ruth 
Rubio-Marin notes that “reparations efforts in the past have 
concentrated on violations of a fairly limited and traditionally 
conceived category of civil and political rights.12  Even within the 
now recognized category of sexual violence—and considering the 
widely documented use of rape in warfare—there remain only a few 
notable examples of official apologies to groups of women for sexual 
violence, past or present. 
 Most famous, perhaps, are the various apologies to former 
‘comfort women’— that is, women from Korea, China, the 
Philippines and other Japan-occupied territories who were forced to 
provide sex to Japanese soldiers, during World War II. These 
apologies took several forms over several decades. In 1992, a 
Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Koichi Kato offered an official 
apology to Korean former comfort women.  Since 1996, letters of 
apology have been sent, signed by various Japanese Prime Ministers, 
to individual former comfort women. Finally, in March of 2007, an 
initial denial that the Japanese government was implicated in sex 
slavery by Prime Minister Toru Yamanaka resulted in an official 
parliament-level apology.13 
 There are a few, more recent, examples of official apologies 
issued in the wake of sexual violence. 2012 saw the US Assistant 
Secretary of State apologize after two American servicemen raped 
                                                 
12 Rubio-Martin, “The Gender of Reparations in Transitional Societies,” 64. 
13 For a more detailed history and analysis of this case, see the special issue of 
positions: asia critique (5:1 Spring 1997) dedicated to discussing the history of 
‘comfort women’, as well as “Comforting the Nation: ‘Comfort Women’, the 
Politics of Apology and the Workings of Gender.”  See also Norma Field, “War 
and Apology: Japan, Asia, the Fiftieth, and After,” Positions: Asia Critique 5.1 (1997): 
1-49; Hyun Sook Kim, “History and Memory: The ‘Comfort Women’ 
Controversy,” positions: asia critique 5.1 (1997): 73-108; Won Soon Park, “Japanese 
Reparations Policies and the ‘Comfort Women’ Question,” Positions: Asia Critique 
5.1 (1997): 107-136; and You-Me Park, “Comfroting the Nation: ‘Comfort 
Women,’ the Politics of Apology and the Workings of Gender,” Interventions: 
International Journal of Postcolonial Studies 2.2 (2000): 199-211.  
7
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Japanese women,14 and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police issue an 
apology for their inaction and recalcitrance in the case of Robert 
Pickton, a Vancouver serial killer who targeted sex trade workers.15  
Yet these incidents are dwarfed by the broader pattern of silence 
following sexual violence. Apologies for documented policies of 
sexual violence during civil and international war have not been 
forthcoming, for the most part, despite repeated calls by advocates 
and NGOs. Notorious examples include the systematic brutalization 
and rape of Bangladeshi women during the 1971 Pakistani invasion,16 
the estimated 100,000 victims of mass rape during the three decades 
of civil war in Guatamala,17 or the victims and survivors of the 60,000 
estimated rapes that took place during the Bosnian War.18  Indeed, 
while Serbian President Tomislav Nikolic recently offered an apology 
                                                 
14 Martin Fackler, “U.S. Troops in Japan on Curfew Amid Rape Inquiries,” The New 
York Times (October 19, 2012); available from 
http:l//www.nytimes.com/2012/10/20/world/asia/curfew-imposed-on-american-
troops-in-japan.html. 
15 The sincerity and extent of this apology remains the subject of controversy.  See 
Susan Lazaruk, “RCMP Offer Apology over Investigation,” Canada.com (January 27, 
2012); available from 
http://www.canada.com/RCMP+offer+apology+over+investigation/6066952/st
ory.html; “RCMP Apologizes for Not Doing More in Pickton Investigation,” The 
Toronto Star, January 27, 2012, sec. News; available from 
http://www.thestar.com/news/article/1122788--rcmp-apologizes-for-not-doing-
more-in-pickton-investigation?bn=1; and “RCMP Apology over Pickton Murder 
‘Not Enough,’ Victim’s Father Says,” The Globe and Mail; available from  
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/british-columbia/rcmp-apology-over-
pickton-murder-not-enough-victims-father-says/article542859/. 
16 Bijoyeta Das, “Bangladesh Rape Victims Say War Crimes Overlooked,” Women’s 
eNews, September 6, 2011; available from 
http://womensenews.org/story/rape/110904/bangladesh-rape-victims-say-war-
crimes-overlooked#.Uh9jJGTTVpI.  
17 Ofelia De Pablo, Javier Zurita, and Giles Tremlett, “Guatemalan War Rape 
Survivors: ‘We Have No Voice,’” The Guardian, July 28, 2011; available from 
http://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2011/jul/28/guatemalan-women-mass-
rape-give-evidence. 
18 Michele Lent Hirschl, “Bosnia (Women’s Media Center: Women Under Siege),” 
February 8, 2012; available from 
http://www.womenundersiegeproject.org/conflicts/profile/bosnia. 
8
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for the massacre of 8,000 Muslims in Srebrenica,19 he failed to 
mention the gang rapes that were part of these genocidal acts, and 
there has been no apology for the mass gang rapes in Foca, in 1992,20 
or indeed the 20,000-60,000 estimated rapes that took place over the 
course of the war, despite calls from organizations like the 
Association of Women Victims of War and Mothers of Srebrenica. If 
we are living in an age of apology, then sexual violence stands in stark 
contrast to the prevailing Zeitgeist. 
 Furthermore, sexual violence is not the only gendered harm 
that calls for apology. There is a gendered dimension to historical 
wrongs not typically categorized as gendered wrongs. These include the 
forced displacement of populations, the removal of children from 
homes and families, as well as control over reproduction, including 
forced abortions and sterilization.  In 2008, the Australian and 
Canadian governments apologized to indigenous peoples for the 
forced removal of children from families and communities, through 
government policies of residential schools and forced placement in 
white homes.  There exist multiple dimensions of serious harm in 
these racist and genocidal policies, but gender is among them. The 
seizure of children led to the destruction of families, homes, and 
communities, and the effects of harms to family are often 
disproportionately felt by women.21 Furthermore, the excuse for 
seizing indigenous children was—in many cases—spurious claims of 
unfit (typically explained as insufficiently Christian) homes. 
Indigenous mothering was judged by colonial authorities to be 
                                                 
19 Damien McElroy, “Serbian President in Historic Srebrenica Massacre Apology,” 
Telegraph.co.uk, April 25, 2013; sec. worldnews; available from 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/serbia/10017552/Serbian-
president-in-historic-Srebrenica-massacre-apology.html. 
20 Brandon Hamber and Ingrid Palmary, “Gender, Memorialization, and Symbolic 
Reparations,” in The Gender of Reparations: Unsettling Sexual Hierarchies While Redressing 
Human Rights Violations, ed. Ruth Rubio-Marin (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009), 368-369. 
21 I discuss these apologies in more detail in Alice MacLachlan, “Government 
Apologies to Indigenous Peoples,” in Justice, Responsibility and Reconciliation in the 
Wake of Conflict, eds. Alice MacLachlan and C. Allen Speight; Boston Studies in 
Philosophy, Religion and Public Life (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013). 
9
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insufficient mothering, and so state and church schools (rife with 
cultural, physical, and sexual violence) were required to remedy this 
supposed gender role failure.22 Indeed, an exhaustive list of apologies 
for gendered harms would also track calls for apology regarding past 
and present government policies of reproductive violence, including 
forced or denied abortions, practices of sterilization, coerced 
marriages, as well as the forcible removal of children from homes. 
These harms are all gendered-based both because they are committed 
against women, and because their spurious justifications invoke 
gender ideals—that is, they are committed against women deemed to 
fall short of gendered ideals of femininity and motherhood. 
 
Apology, Power, and Performance 
The remainder of my discussion turns from the possible content of 
public apologies to the practice itself. Gender complicates how an 
apology is performed, taken up, and read by others, as well as the 
apology’s transformative significance for broader political change, in 
ways that are not immediately evident.  First of all, people of 
different genders are likely to be socialized differently when it comes 
to the rhetorical spaces of apology: that is, situations of conflict, 
anger, and resentment. Women—that is, persons socialized to see 
themselves as feminine and who are treated as feminine by others—
face pressures to be “compassionate and giving” rather than “angry 
and vindictive” victims that men in positions of privilege do not. 
Indeed, there is a substantial body of feminist work that describes 
how women are socialized not to express anger, how their anger is 
less likely to receive uptake from others, and how it may even lead to 
significant social punishment.23  Just who is able to express 
                                                 
22 This is discussed in detail the role that sexism and sexual violence played in the 
colonial suppression of indigenous cultures across North America in Andrea Smith, 
Conquest: Sexual Violence and the American Indian Genocide (Cambridge, MA: South 
End Press, 2005). 
23 This is not to say that only women experience such pressures, or that all women 
face them uniformly.  For example, men of colour – whose anger is stigmatized 
and exaggerated in racist society – may also experience pressure to be ‘calm’, 
‘cooperative’ victims that white men and women do not. Similarly, persons 
10
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resentment, whose resentment gets read as appropriate, forceful and 
justified, and which protests are seen as warranting a response—these 
variables affect practices of apology. Women may be at risk of 
prematurely accepting apologies, accepting them for problematic 
reasons, or offering them for wrongs for which they are not 
responsible.  
 This scholarship redirects our attention from the apology 
itself to the rhetorical space in which it is uttered, a rhetorical space 
that is inflected by power. Philosophers have tended to focus on 
apology as a moral space, in which the apologizer lowers herself to the 
recipient, correcting for the asymmetrical disrespect of wrongdoing.24 
But apologies also take place in social spaces, marked by various 
asymmetries of social and political power, and thus vary widely in 
their expressions of power. We need only consider the difference 
between “I’m so, so very sorry—please, please forgive me” when 
spoken in rushed, anxious and soft tones and “I accept full 
responsibility for this unfortunate incident and sincerely apologize for 
                                                                                                             
diagnosed with mental illnesses may fear being labeled ‘hysterical’, ‘unreasonable’ or 
‘mad’, in ways that track the stigma attached to female anger (certainly, the history 
of mental illness diagnosis is itself gendered). In other words, thinking about 
rhetorical spaces of anger draws our attention to multiple forms of oppression, and 
how these affect practices of apology.  See Marilyn Frye, “A Note on Anger,” in 
The Politics of Reality (Berkeley: Crossing Press, 1983); Audre Lorde, “The Uses of 
Anger: Women Responding to Racism,” in Sister Outsider (Los Angeles: Crossing 
Press, 1984); Sue Campbell, “Being Dismissed: The Politics of Emotional 
Expression,” Hypatia 9.3 (1994): 46-65; Sharon Lamb, “Forgiveness Therapy in 
Gendered Contexts: What Happens to the Truth?” in Trauma, Truth and 
Reconciliation, ed. Nancy Potter (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); Alison 
Jaggar, “Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist Epistemology,” in The Feminist 
Philosophy Reader, eds. A. Bailey and C. Cuomo (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2008); 
Kathryn Norlock, Forgiveness from a Feminist Perspective (Lanham  MD: Lexington 
Books, 2009); and Carol Gilligan, Joining the Resistance: Psychology, Politics, Girls, and 
Women (New York: Polity Press, 2011).  
24 Jean Hampton, “Forgiveness, Resentment and Hatred,” in Jeffrie Murphy and 
Jean Hampton, Forgiveness and Mercy (New York; Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988); Pamela Hieronymi, “Articulating an Uncompromising Forgiveness,” 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62.3  (May 1, 2001): 529–555; and Adrienne 
M. Martin, “Owning up and Lowering down: The Power of Apology,” Journal of 
Philosophy 107.10 (2010): 534-553. 
11
MacLachlan: Gender and Public Apology
Published by Scholarship@Western, 2013
  
 
 
 
 
137   Gender and the Public Apology 
 
Transitional Justice Review, Vol.1, Iss.2, 2013, 126-147 
 
any offense,” uttered loudly, slowly, with confidence and authority. 
The former renounces social or interpersonal power, while the latter 
reinforces it. Words of apology can function as performative 
softeners, offering up moral authority or, on the other hand, they can 
serve to retain control over the rhetorical space: asserting a particular 
narrative while demanding that the hearer now respond. Philosopher 
Elizabeth Spelman describes the latter effect as the ‘subpoena’ power 
of apology, “pressing you for an appearance, a response… You have 
lost the moral high ground your anger might have afforded you. But 
more, it shifts the burden now to you.”25 Legal scholar Julie Stubbs 
notes that there is not only a “strong social norm that encourages 
victims to accept an apology, even if it is not a convincing apology” 
but further that “apology is a common strategy used by abusive 
men…a feature of the ‘cycle of violence’.”26  
The social identities (and attendant socialization) of 
apologizer and recipient are relevant to how we understand the 
relational effects of apology: that is, how it changes the relationship 
between speaker and hearer. Indeed, gender is not the only relevant 
variable at play here—apologies between individuals of different 
races, classes, ages, abilities and citizenships may require similar 
considerations of social power. Furthermore, considering the 
rhetorical spaces of apology reveals that we cannot assume apologies 
always function to effectively ‘lower’ the apologizer or ‘raise’ the 
recipient. Indeed, even in strictly moral terms, apologies do not 
always have an ultimately ‘lowering’ effect; equally, they are acts of 
moral cleansing. In apologizing, I take responsibility for wrong-doing 
but I also cast myself as right-thinking: someone who recognizes 
appropriate moral norms and possesses the courage to face up to 
past misdeeds, rather than shying away from my accuser. All in all, 
the apologizer can come out of the apology looking better and not 
worse.27 In other words, the power dynamics of apologies compound 
the problem of widespread failures to appropriately recognize and 
                                                 
25 Spelman, Repair, 99. 
26 Stubbs, “Beyond Apology?” 177. 
27 I discuss the inflections of power in rhetorical spaces of apology in more detail in 
“Telling Sorry Stories” (unpublished).  
12
Transitional Justice Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 6
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/tjreview/vol1/iss2/6
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5206/tjr.2013.1.2.6
  
 
 
 
 
Alice MacLachlan  138 
 
Transitional Justice Review, Vol.1, Iss.2, 2013, 126-147 
 
offer reparations for gendered harms. Not only are gendered harms 
less likely to be recognized and gendered expressions of resentment 
less likely to be given uptake, but the moral practices we employ to 
manage and repair wrongdoing (apologies, acceptance, forgiveness) 
may reinforce rather than disrupt the asymmetries between 
wrongdoer and victim. 
 
Public and Private Narratives 
Above, I noted that the narrative power of official apologies is 
significant, because they typically address a vast audience beyond the 
recipient, through national and international media coverage. This is 
not merely a question of large numbers. Official apologies are public 
narratives; they are uttered in public spaces, by public representatives, 
and are thus treated as matters of public interest, invoking the 
interests and concerns of society as a whole. From a gendered 
perspective, the public quality of official apologies is crucial, as the 
public/private binary and subsequent relegation of the feminine to 
the private sphere often comes to the fore in times of conflict.  First, 
women’s roles in conflict and resistance are often overlooked and 
depoliticized, even by women themselves. Colleen Duggan and Adila 
Abusharaf note that testimonials by women to truth commissions 
tend to concern “experiences of their menfolk, their children, and 
their loved ones” rather than the harms they themselves have 
suffered, or the actions they themselves have taken.28 Second, victims 
of sexual and gendered violence often face significant socially 
enforced silence, shaming, and ostracization. As a result, such 
violence either remains entirely invisible, or is treated as abstract, a 
“stain on upon the social fabric of the nation, rather than being 
interpreted as a violation of women’s rights as individuals.”29 Duggan 
and Abusharaf conclude that women victims are mostly like to fall 
between the cracks of truth commissions, which are less likely to be 
                                                 
28 Colleen Duggan and Adila Abusharaf, “Reparation of Sexual Violence in 
Democratic Transitions: The Search for Gender Justice,” in The Handbook of 
Reparations,  ed. Pablo De Greiff (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 639. 
29 Ibid., 631. 
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gender-attentive, and women’s groups, which are forward- rather 
than backward-looking in their focus. 
 Given the relegation of women’s experiences of harm, there 
is moral and political significance to the recognition offered by the 
sheer fact of public apology. An official apology has the power to 
name harms to women as wrongful harms, when they have not 
previously been publicly recognized as such. At the same time, it also 
asserts public (i.e. state or society-wide) responsibility for what are 
often seen as private, apolitical matters, or inevitable consequences of 
biology and soldier ‘boys being boys.’ Finally, public apologies name 
the victims as appropriate moral addressees, persons worth taking 
seriously and holding others accountable. A public apology, done 
well, offers tripartite recognition: women victims are named as moral 
interlocutors,30 gendered and sexual harms are identified as 
significantly wrongful, and the state takes wider social responsibility 
for cultures of impunity around sexism and sexual violence. The 
performance of a public apology—words read out by a person of 
authority, in the space of government, and given air-time by national 
and international audiences–brings what has been considered private 
into public space through the presence of the victims who carry the 
marks of harm, thus disrupting the familiar public/private binary that 
hides harms to women and sexual abuse in private homes, reinforces 
patriarchy, and limits women’s agency. Public apologies can thus 
potentially play a role in changing problematic gender dynamics and 
public conceptions of gender, and these social changes, in turn, may 
be an important part of post-conflict social and political repair.31 
                                                 
30 Lynne Tirrell, “Apologizing for Atrocity: Rwanda and Recognition,” in Justice, 
Responsibility and Reconciliation in the Wake of Conflict, eds. Alice MacLachlan and C. 
Allen Speight (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013). 
31 Philosopher Colleen Murphy has argued that we should measure political 
reconciliation partly in terms of post-conflict political relationships that 
demonstrate reciprocity and respect for agency. See Colleen Murphy,  A Moral 
Theory of Political Reconciliation (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2010). We can expand Murphy’s argument and note that, since sexist relationships 
are asymmetrical rather than reciprocal, and disrespect women’s agency, changing 
widespread sexist conceptions of gender also contributes to conditions of political 
reconciliation throughout a given society.  
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 Of course, to achieve this recognition, public apologies must 
get the narrative right. Misrepresenting, neglecting or glossing over 
wrongs, and failing to acknowledge victims and their experiences, 
risks re-inflicting harms of silencing and disrespect. Furthermore, it 
plays into the gendered dynamics described in the previous section, 
creating a rhetorical space where there is excessive pressure on 
women to shoulder the responsibility for relational harmony by 
accepting the apology. Yet naming the harm appropriately is 
complicated by patriarchy, as the identification of the exact ‘harm’ 
involved in harmful treatments of women may itself be open to sexist 
interpretation.  Many have critiqued the apology letters by Japanese 
Prime Ministers to former ‘comfort women’ for remaining vague 
about the nature of the violations in question, retaining euphemistic 
language, and tending to emphasize the harm to “honour and 
dignity”—an understanding of sexual slavery and violence that 
reinforces the link between women’s agency and value, on the one 
hand, and their sexuality and, especially, their sexual purity, on the 
other. 
 Moreover, the recognition power of apology can be 
compromised not only by the story that is told, but also by the choice 
of storyteller and the process of story-creation. In the context of 
transnational public apologies, one head of state typically apologizes 
to another. Since there remain very few female heads of state, public 
apologies are often made by one man and to another, each standing 
in for a broader group or polity. If women are present only as the 
objects of apology (that which is apologized for) and not the subjects 
of apology (either as speaker or hearer), then their subjectivity and 
agency is undermined and the private/public division is reinforced 
and not challenged. There is something especially disconcerting about 
representative responsibility, when the harm in question is gendered 
sexual violence.  As Helen Field remarks: 
Think, for example, of Prime Minister Hosokawa apologizing 
for Japanese colonial rule, including the institution of military 
comfort women, and South Korea President Kim Young Sam 
praising the prime minister’s “understanding of history”…  
How, one wonders, did those two men, in the prime of 
15
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public life, understand the sexual humiliation and unending 
suffering of those elderly women, for the most part of 
humble origin?32  
 
Earlier I noted that apologies reinforce and vindicate the 
agency of the victim, by telling the story of the wrong as she herself 
understands it (“Yes, that’s it, that’s what happened to me…”).  But 
without consultation and attention to what victims themselves have 
to say, apologies remain wrongdoer narratives; the wrongdoer has the 
microphone, after all, even if he is uttering what it is victims would 
have chosen to acknowledge, had they the choice. This is risky for 
any apology, but particularly when individuals with considerable 
political power speak on behalf of those with very little, with very 
different experiences, and whose harms are likely to be made invisible 
or misrepresented.33 An apologizer who gets the content, tone and 
sincerity of apology right, from the perspective of standard 
philosophical theories, can thus go morally wrong. Without attention 
to and care for victim input, the apology is paternalistic at best. At 
worst, the apologizer further objectifies the victim, making her the 
object and not the author of her own experiences.34  
 Even the notion of giving voice to silenced harms is not 
without its moral pitfalls.  While public, authoritative, truth telling 
around gendered and sexual violence may ultimately disrupt cultures 
of shame and silence, one apology alone cannot accomplish this 
cultural transformation. As long as stigmas and repressive norms 
around women’s sexuality persevere, such apologies risks re-harming 
                                                 
32 Field, “War and Apology,” 7-8. 
33 This also highlights an interesting asymmetry between public and interpersonal 
apologies. While the request for victim input is usually taken to be a sign of 
insensitive (i.e. bad) private apology – i.e. “Just tell me what to say and I’ll say it!” – 
it can add value to a public apology, especially if the victims have not typically had 
their voices represented by the state. 
34 Indeed, we might describe such apologies as a particularly egregious form of the 
sexist act colloquially known as ‘mansplaining’, i.e. when a man informs a woman 
of something, at length, that she is in a much better to know (in this case, her own 
history of hurt), because of his (unconscious) presumption that he has 
epistemological authority and she does not. 
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and humiliating individual victims in the name of that broader social 
change. Public apologies may inadvertently “out” victims of sexual 
violence, if they are named or alluded to in identifiable ways, putting 
them at risk of public humiliation and shame, further ostracization, 
and material consequences including the loss of income, home and 
family, as well as exposure to physical violence and death. 
 Solutions to these dilemmas rest in how practices of public 
apology prioritize the agency of victims. This will vary from case to 
case, meaning that one ‘good’ apology may not resemble another.  
Instead of focusing on the conditions for performance of public 
apology and the inner state of the apologizer, we need to examine who 
is in a position to offer such apologies, how and where they are 
offered (whether verbal or written, public or sequestered, anonymous 
or named) and the extent to which the agency of the victims is 
prioritized, in the periods leading up to and following the apology. 
For theorists of apologies, this means focusing on apologies as 
practice rather than performance. The value of an uttered apology 
may lie in the process of constructing what ultimately gets said—who 
is involved, how equal and collaborative the process is, and who is 
chosen to speak—rather than the isolated act of speaking those 
words sincerely.  
Equally important are the rhetorical spaces that follow and 
are opened up by an apology.  As noted above, apologies can demand 
certain responses from victims and foreclose others, especially when 
those victims are socialized to repress anger and prioritize harmony: 
in Spelman’s words, their interpersonal powers of ‘subpoena.’35 
However powerful public apologies may be, they are unlikely to 
magically accomplish victim healing, which means that primary and 
secondary victims may still want to revisit histories of harm, 
uncovering further details and bringing new evidence and insights to 
light.36 Thus, we have reason to distinguish between apologies that 
                                                 
35 Spelman, Repair. 
36 For example, Canadian historian Ian Mosby’s recent research uncovered a grim 
history of nutritional experiments and tests performed on malnourished Aboriginal 
children in residential schools, several years after the Canadian government apology 
Ian Mosby, “Administering Colonial Science: Nutrition Research and Human 
17
MacLachlan: Gender and Public Apology
Published by Scholarship@Western, 2013
  
 
 
 
 
143   Gender and the Public Apology 
 
Transitional Justice Review, Vol.1, Iss.2, 2013, 126-147 
 
function as subpoenas and those that open up rhetorical space for a 
wide variety of responses; the latter and not the former will likely 
reinforce victim agency.  Philosophers have typically defined a good 
apology as one that gives the recipient definitive reasons to accept it. 
This assumes that the state of harmony that follows the acceptance 
of apology is always better than the disharmony that preceded it. 
When it comes to complicated histories of public and private 
wrongdoing, gendered or otherwise, this assumption does not hold. 
In gendered political contexts, where the apology may be one step in 
a longer process of negotiated narrative and meaning, ‘good’ 
apologies leave space for resistance as well as acceptance. 
 
Apology, Gender and Responsibility 
Skeptics of public apology fear that unless they are accompanied by 
some other, material, measure of responsibility, such apologies are 
little more than a cheap and empty gesture; they seem to take 
responsibility while actually failing to do so in any concrete way.  
Simply naming oneself as responsible is not sufficient for moral self-
congratulation, such skeptics object. The question is not, is the 
government responsible for past violence or injustice? (since all too often, there 
is widespread, credible evidence and common understanding that 
they are) but rather what will they do about it? And certainly, apology-
skeptics have a point: apologies can potentially attend more to the 
state of the wrongdoers’ souls than the state of the victims’ lives, 
purging guilt and purifying the polity by narrating a story of moral 
growth and development, while victims remain marginalized, 
deprived and in compromised material circumstances.37 Indeed, one 
                                                                                                             
Biomedical Experimentation in Aboriginal Communities and Residential Schools, 
1942-1952,” Histoire sociale/Social History 46, no. 91 (2013): 145–172.. Assembly of 
First Nations Chief Shawn Atleo and other First Nations leaders have demanded a 
new apology, further inquiry, and measures of reparation, but these calls are being 
resisted by the Canadian federal government “First Nations Leaders Demand 
Apology for Nutritional Experiments - Manitoba - CBC News,” accessed August 
29, 2013, http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/story/2013/07/17/mb-
aboriginal-children-nutritional-experiments-reax-national.html.. 
37 For example, the 2008 Canadian apology for residential schools stated that “we 
now recognize it was wrong” to separate indigenous children from their families 
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of the benefits of thinking about apologies as a process and not a 
performance the process may include not only future dialogue, but 
also the material and political commitments made in the apology 
utterance. Good processes of apology may have financial as well as 
discursive dimensions. 
At the same time, even the mere admission of state 
responsibility is often a tremendous step forward, when it comes to 
gender violence and injustice. Human rights scholars and activists 
continue to hotly debate the extent to which states can be held 
responsible for patterns and practices of gender-based violence and 
inequality, despite the UN Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 1979.38 
Despite ever-increasing research and investigation into the systematic 
basis for rape as a tool of war, and gender violence as a tool of 
colonialism, specific harms to women are too often dismissed as the 
result of ‘bad apples,’ ‘soldier boys being boys’ or problematic, but 
private and apolitical matters. The ceremony and publicity of an 
official apology challenge this perception.  A public narrative of 
responsibility, even without further (financial) measure, accomplishes 
three things: first, by naming the harms together in public, it draws 
connections between seemingly discrete incidents, revealing a broader 
culture of impunity and sexism.  Second, it brings the wrongfulness 
of sexual and gender-based harms into broader, national 
                                                                                                             
and culture, as if this realization was a new development, prompting the apology—
the result of recent soul-searching and moral progress. Yet Canada had signed and 
ratified the 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, 
many decades before the last residential school closed. The Convention lists, in 
Article 2, “forcibly transferring the children of the group to another group” as an 
act of genocide.  See Sara Ahmed, The Cultural Politics of Emotion, 1st ed. (New York: 
Routledge, 2004), 101-121. 
38 CEDAW holds that states party to the convention, in addition to taking 
responsibility for specific state-sponsored human rights violations, must “modify 
the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women with a view to 
achieving the elimination of prejudices and customs and all other practices which 
are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or 
on stereotyped roles for men and women,” in Article 5.  See Parekh, “Getting to 
the Root of Gender Inequality.”. 
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conversation. Third, by taking responsibility for these harms, the 
government implicitly commits itself to discharging that 
responsibility—meaning that others can now hold the government 
accountable for that commitment. Moreover, as Serena Parekh notes, 
governments are able to discharge responsibilities for structural 
problems in ways that individuals cannot: publicizing and educating 
others about their role in widespread harms, changing processes that 
made these harms possible, and acting collectively in response to 
those harms.39 
 Furthermore, symbolic acts of reparation have some 
advantages that material reparations do not. Brandon Hamber and 
Ingrid Palmary note: 
Symbolic offer a unique opportunity to produce complex 
narratives because, unlike legal questions concerning, say, 
compensation where more clear delineations are needed 
between victim and perpetrators, symbolic measures, such as 
memorials, apologies, public acknowledgments, or museum 
projects, can offer abstract and complex representations of 
conflict.40  
  
If patterns of responsibility for sexual and gender violence are 
complex, as Parekh argues, then measures adopted to express and 
acknowledge that responsibility may need to tell equally complex 
narratives. Furthermore, there are additional complications involved 
in measuring out responsibility in financial form when it comes to 
sexual violence, because of the persistent stigma attached to sex work 
and ‘sex for money’ in patriarchal societies. How the wrong for 
which money is offered gets named, in the apology, can alleviate the 
dangers of re-harming victims through stigma. Navigating the 
relationship between apology, responsibility and financial 
                                                 
39 Serena Parekh, “Getting to the Root of Gender Inequality: Structural Injustice 
and Political Responsibility,” Hypatia 26, no. 4 (2011): 672–689. 
40 Brandon Hamber and Ingrid Palmary, “Gender, Memorialization, and Symbolic 
Reparations,” in The Gender of Reparations: Unsettling Sexual Hierarchies While Redressing 
Human Rights Violations, ed. Ruth Rubio-Marin (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009), 379. 
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compensation will again be a question of process rather than 
performance, with particular attention to how the agency of women 
victims is prioritized during that process. 
 
Conclusion 
I have argued that normative theorists of public apology need to 
incorporate considerations of gender into their work, since gender is 
implicated both in many of the harms for which public apologies are 
offered, and in the practice, significance, and impact of offering 
public apologies in general. Thinking about gender draws our 
attention to the power dynamics of apology, revealing that not every 
instance of apology is a case of the apologizer ‘lowering’ him or 
herself, and that social identities play a role in how we offer and 
accept apologies, and the meaning we attribute to them.  Moreover, 
in the case of public apologies, in particular, attention to gender 
reveals the significance of apologies as public narratives, and their 
power to challenge or reinforce problematic public/private 
distinctions, as well as telling complex stories of public responsibility 
for sexual and gender violence. Most significantly, thinking about 
gender (and indeed, the asymmetrical power relationships created by 
social power and group identity, more generally) reveals that the 
moral value of apologies does not ultimately lie in the performance of 
words or the inner state of the apologizer who utters them. If, as 
philosophers have argued, apologies are valuable because they respect 
the agency of victims, then that respect emerges most in the 
processes of discourse, negotiation, and listening that precede and 
follow that utterance, “We’re Sorry.” 
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